Author
Abstract
In July 2023, the German federal government published its “Strategy on China”. This had been mandated by the 2021 coalition agreement, but happened quite a bit later than originally intended. While the Strategy is the first ever comprehensive document to set out the federal government’s China policy, it can – and should – be compared to the federal foreign office’s East Asia Concept of 2002 that also established basic tenets of German China policy. Remarkably, the principles enunciated in both documents are the same or very similar: The references to basic values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights have not changed, Tibet and Xinjiang are mentioned prominently. Then, as now, there is an appeal to Beijing to assume responsibility for world peace and global affairs. There is also no change regarding the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and for German across-the-board cooperation with EU partners on China. Major differences exist, however, on economic issues. Two decades ago, China was the largest recipient of German development aid; now it is, depending on the yardstick used, the world’s second-largest or largest economy. In 2002, German companies in China were seen as an asset in the endeavor to bring Western values to China; in 2023, they are regarded as a risk possibly causing an overdependence on China. The Strategy is based on the assumption that China has changed – meaning: for the worse – and that as a result Germany needs to change its approach to China. One of the Strategy’s central features is the concept of “de-risking” the German economy from China. This has, however, failed so far: Since the Strategy’s adoption, German companies have invested more in China than ever before. The jury is still out on whether the Strategy will over the coming years be a blueprint for Germany’s China policy. Basing oneself on the fate of the Concept, that is rather not to be expected. It would, however, be erroneous to presume that Beijing’s policies can only move in one direction. That would disregard the experience that the policies of the Communist Party have over the past decades been prone to considerable swings – the most recent example being the sudden demise of the zero-COVID policy. It is therefore not excluded that relations between Germany and China could become closer again in future.
Suggested Citation
Handle:
RePEc:vrs:ecdipl:v:3:y:2025:i:1:p:1-12:n:1001
DOI: 10.2478/ecdip-2024-0003
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