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CEO Tenure, Narcissism, and Greed: Do They Influence Corporate Tax Avoidance?

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  • Asep Mohamad Taufik Hidayat

    (Department of Accounting Universitas Mercu Buana, Jakarta, Indonesia)

  • Agustin Fadjarenie

    (Department of Accounting Universitas Mercu Buana, Jakarta, Indonesia)

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the influence of the existence of independent commissioners, tenure CEOs, narcissism CEOs, and greedy CEOs on tax avoidance in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2019–2023 period. Tax avoidance is a company's strategy to reduce the tax burden legally, but it often causes controversy related to business ethics. This study uses secondary data from the company's annual report which is analyzed by multiple regression method. The results show that CEO narcissism and greedy CEOs have a significant positive influence on tax avoidance, indicating that the higher the level of narcissism and greed of CEOs, the greater the tendency of companies to avoid taxes. Furthermore, the existence of independent commissioners and the CEO's tenure have a significant positive effect on tax avoidance. This finding has implications for regulators and stakeholders to strengthen the supervisory mechanism over the CEO's strategic decisions in corporate tax management. In addition, this study emphasizes the importance of the role of independent commissioners in maintaining corporate tax transparency and accountability.

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Handle: RePEc:alk:jefas0:v:7:y:2025:i:2:id:8966
DOI: 10.32996/jefas.2025.7.2.6
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