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Credible Auctions: A Trilemma
Citations
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Cited by:
- Alexander Teytelboym & Shengwu Li & Scott Duke Kominers & Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak, 2021. "Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(3), pages 709-750, July.
- Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden, 2022.
"Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus,"
Papers
2206.10065, arXiv.org.
- Joshua S. Gans & Richard T. Holden, 2022. "Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus," NBER Working Papers 30189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tim Roughgarden, 2021. "Transaction Fee Mechanism Design," Papers 2106.01340, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
- Andreas Haupt & Zoe Hitzig, 2021. "Contextually Private Mechanisms," Papers 2112.10812, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
- Ahrash Dianat & Mikhail Freer, 2021. "Credibility in Second-Price Auctions: An Experimental Test," Papers 2105.00204, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
- Vincent Conitzer & Christian Kroer & Debmalya Panigrahi & Okke Schrijvers & Nicolas E. Stier-Moses & Eric Sodomka & Christopher A. Wilkens, 2022. "Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 8515-8535, December.
- Burchardi, Konrad B. & de Quidt, Jonathan & Gulesci, Selim & Lerva, Benedetta & Tripodi, Stefano, 2021.
"Testing willingness to pay elicitation mechanisms in the field: Evidence from Uganda,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
- de Quidt, Jonathan & Burchardi, Konrad & Gulesci, Selim & Lerva, Benedetta & Tripodi, Stefano, 2021. "Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda," CEPR Discussion Papers 15809, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Konrad B. Burchardi & Jonathan de Quidt & Selim Gulesci & Benedetta Lerva & Stefano Tripodi, 2021. "Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda," CESifo Working Paper Series 8904, CESifo.
- Burchardi, Konrad & de Quidt, Jonathan & Gulesci, Selim & Lerva, Benedetta & Tripodi, Stefano, 2021. "Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 541, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Aranyak Mehta & Andres Perlroth, 2023. "Auctions without commitment in the auto-bidding world," Papers 2301.07312, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
- Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(6), pages 2629-2661, November.
- Meryem Essaidi & Matheus V. X. Ferreira & S. Matthew Weinberg, 2022. "Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions," Papers 2205.14758, arXiv.org.
- Marek Pycia & M. Utku Ünver, 2021.
"Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
1044, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Pycia, Marek & Ãœnver, M. Utku, 2022. "Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 16872, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Elijah Fox & Mallesh Pai & Max Resnick, 2023. "Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions," Papers 2301.13321, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
- Rustamdjan Hakimov & Madhav Raghavan, 2023. "Improving Transparency and Verifiability in School Admissions: Theory and Experiment," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 376, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Aram Grigoryan & Markus Moller, 2023. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms," Papers 2305.09314, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
- Carolyn Predmore & Kudret Topyan & Lauren Trabold Apadula, 2021. "Impact of Process Misconception in Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Single Response Value Elicitation Procedures: An Experimental Investigation in Consumer Behavior Using the IKEA Effect," Economies, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-13, November.
- Wenpin Tang & David D. Yao, 2023. "Transaction fee mechanism for Proof-of-Stake protocol," Papers 2308.13881, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
- Birulin, Oleksii, 2020. "Optimality of simple procurement auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Brzustowski, Thomas & Georgiadis Harris, Alkis & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Smart contracts and the Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 117950, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Tim Roughgarden, 2020. "Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559," Papers 2012.00854, arXiv.org.
- Balzer, Benjamin & Rosato, Antonio & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2022.
"Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
- Benjamin Balzer & Antonio Rosato & Jonas von Wangenheim, 2021. "Dutch vs. First-Price Auctions With Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Bidders," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_314, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2022. "Using Divide and Conquer to Improve Tax Collection: Theory and Laboratory Evidence," Working Papers 299, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira & David C. Parkes, 2022. "Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules," Papers 2209.15569, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
- Bernardo David & Lorenzo Gentile & Mohsen Pourpouneh, 2021. "FAST: Fair Auctions via Secret Transactions," IFRO Working Paper 2021/02, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
- Pycia, Marek & Ãœnver, M. Utku, 2020. "Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in the Allocation of Discrete Resources," CEPR Discussion Papers 15377, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Maryam Bahrani & Pranav Garimidi & Tim Roughgarden, 2023. "Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers," Papers 2307.01686, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira & Daniel J. Moroz & David C. Parkes & Mitchell Stern, 2021. "Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market," Papers 2103.14144, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
- Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.
- Sylvain Chassang & Lucia Del Carpio & Samuel Kapon, 2020. "Making the Most of Limited Government Capacity: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 2020-7, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Soo Hong Chew & Wenqian Wang, 2022. "Information Design of Dynamic Mechanisms," Papers 2205.10844, arXiv.org.
- Marta Boczoń & Alistair J. Wilson, 2023. "Goals, Constraints, and Transparently Fair Assignments: A Field Study of Randomization Design in the UEFA Champions League," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3474-3491, June.
- Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Ori Heffetz & Clayton Thomas, 2022. "Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions," Papers 2209.13148, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
- Saeed Alaei & Ali Makhdoumi & Azarakhsh Malekian & Rad Niazadeh, 2022. "Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality," Papers 2203.01384, arXiv.org.