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Identification and Inference in Ascending Auctions With Correlated Private Values

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Cited by:

  1. Aradillas-López, Andrés & Rosen, Adam M., 2022. "Inference in ordered response games with complete information," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 451-476.
  2. Yusuke Matsuki, 2016. "A Distribution-Free Test of Monotonicity with an Application to Auctions," Working Papers e110, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
  3. Ho, Kate & Rosen, Adam M., 2015. "Partial Identification in Applied Research: Benefits and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 10883, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Fang, Hanming & Tang, Xun, 2014. "Inference of bidders’ risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 180(2), pages 198-216.
  5. Zincenko, Federico, 2018. "Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 205(2), pages 303-335.
  6. Hanming Fang & Xun Tang, 2013. "Inference of Bidders’ Risk Attitudes in Ascending Auctions with Endogenous Entry," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-056, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  7. Yu Zhu, 2020. "Inference in nonparametric/semiparametric moment equality models with shape restrictions," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), pages 609-636, May.
  8. Kim, Dong-Hyuk, 2013. "Optimal choice of a reserve price under uncertainty," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 587-602.
  9. Nianqing Liu & Yao Luo, 2017. "A Nonparametric Test For Comparing Valuation Distributions In First‐Price Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(3), pages 857-888, August.
  10. Joachim Freyberger & Bradley J. Larsen, 2022. "Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), pages 505-543, May.
  11. Tatoutchoup, Francis Didier, 2017. "Forestry auctions with interdependent values: Evidence from timber auctions," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 107-115.
  12. Gimenes, Nathalie & Guerre, Emmanuel, 2020. "Nonparametric identification of an interdependent value model with buyer covariates from first-price auction bids," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 219(1), pages 1-18.
  13. Marleen Marra, 2019. "Pricing and Fees in Auction Platforms with Two-Sided Entry," Working Papers hal-03393068, HAL.
  14. Gimenes, Nathalie & Guerre, Emmanuel, 2022. "Quantile regression methods for first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 224-247.
  15. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Luo, Yao, 2020. "Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 354-374.
  17. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
  18. James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2016. "Bailouts and the Preservation of Competition: The Case of the Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 257-288, August.
  19. Jayeeta Bhattacharya & Nathalie Gimenes & Emmanuel Guerre, 2019. "Semiparametric Quantile Models for Ascending Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders," Papers 1911.13063, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
  20. Gaurab Aryal & Dong-Hyuk Kim, 2013. "Emprical Relevance of Ambiguity in First Price Auction Models," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-607, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  21. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2014. "Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 248-263.
  23. Aradillas-López, Andrés & Gandhi, Amit & Quint, Daniel, 2016. "A simple test for moment inequality models with an application to English auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 194(1), pages 96-115.
  24. Nathalie Gimenes & Emmanuel Guerre, 2019. "Nonparametric identification of an interdependent value model with buyer covariates from first-price auction bids," Papers 1910.10646, arXiv.org.
  25. Andrew Chesher & Adam Rosen, 2017. "Incomplete English auction models with heterogeneity," CeMMAP working papers CWP27/17, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  26. Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Kane Sweeney & Caio Waisman, 2021. "Scalable Optimal Online Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 593-618, July.
  27. Krasnokutskaya, Elena & Song, Kyungchul & Tang, Xun, 2022. "Estimating unobserved individual heterogeneity using pairwise comparisons," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 477-497.
  28. Nathalie Gimenes, 2014. "Econometrics of Ascending Auctions by Quantile Regression," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2014_25, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
  29. Barkley, Aaron & Groeger, Joachim R. & Miller, Robert A., 2021. "Bidding frictions in ascending auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 223(2), pages 376-400.
  30. Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2019. "Identification of Auction Models Using Order Statistics," Working Papers tecipa-630, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  31. Francesca Molinari, 2020. "Microeconometrics with Partial Identification," Papers 2004.11751, arXiv.org.
  32. JoonHwan Cho & Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2022. "Deconvolution from Two Order Statistics," Working Papers tecipa-739, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  33. Marleen Marra, 2020. "Sample Spacings for Identification: The Case of English Auctions with Absentee Bidding," Working Papers hal-03878412, HAL.
  34. James W. Roberts, 2013. "Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 712-732, December.
  35. Francesca Molinari, 2019. "Econometrics with Partial Identification," CeMMAP working papers CWP25/19, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  36. Andrew Chesher & Adam Rosen, 2015. "Identification of the distribution of valuations in an incomplete model of English auctions," CeMMAP working papers CWP30/15, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  37. Grundl, Serafin & Zhu, Yu, 2019. "Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 210(2), pages 363-378.
  38. Lu, Jiaxuan, 2023. "The economics of China’s between-city height competition: A regression discontinuity approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
  39. Cristián Hernández & Daniel Quint & Christopher Turansick, 2020. "Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 868-904, September.
  40. Kirkegaard, René, 2022. "Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 234-239.
  41. Luo, Yao & Xiao, Ruli, 2023. "Identification of auction models using order statistics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 236(1).
  42. Aryal, Gaurab & Grundl, Serafin & Kim, Dong-Hyuk & Zhu, Yu, 2018. "Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 204(2), pages 189-206.
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