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Choice Democracy

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  • Olivier Ledoit

Abstract

Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: "Choice Democracy". Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Ledoit, 2011. "Choice Democracy," ECON - Working Papers 038, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:econwp:038
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    File URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/51542/1/econwp038.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; choice; polyarchy; stability; competition; effciency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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