AbstractDemocracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: "Choice Democracy". Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics - University of Zurich in its series ECON - Working Papers with number 038.
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Democracy; choice; polyarchy; stability; competition; effciency;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-11-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-11-14 (Positive Political Economics)
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