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Inviting or avoiding deception through trust? Conceptual exploration of an ambivalent relationship

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  • Möllering, Guido

Abstract

The paper explores conceptually the relationship between trust and deception. The author advances five main propositions, which concern deceptive signals of trustworthiness, the suspension of uncertainty in trust, the moral implications of trusting and deceiving, the trustor's self-deception, and the reversibility of trust. The overall conclusion is that trust and deception both enable and prevent one another and that this ambivalent relationship is due to the leaps and lapses of faith that characterize trust and distrust. Beyond implications for further research on trust and deception, the trust-deception ambivalence is practically relevant for making better sense of cases of deception in private and public life against the background of trust relationships that enable, prevent, require, and prohibit deception - all at the same time.

Suggested Citation

  • Möllering, Guido, 2008. "Inviting or avoiding deception through trust? Conceptual exploration of an ambivalent relationship," MPIfG Working Paper 08/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgw:081
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frédérique Six, 2005. "The Trouble with Trust," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3778.
    2. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    3. Beckert, Jens, 2005. "Trust and the Performative Construction of Markets," MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    4. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2003. "Truth or Consequences: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(1), pages 116-130, January.
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