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The impact of RAN sharing

Author

Listed:
  • Ivaldi, Marc
  • Aimene, Louise
  • Jeanjean, Francois
  • Liang, Julienne

Abstract

In this paper, we formulate and estimate a structural model of demand to analyse the equilibrium effect of the RAN sharing by using cross-country panel data in 28 EU countries in years 2010-2020. Based on model estimates, our simulation analysis in Spain firstly provides a quantitative assessment of the impact of RAN sharing on mobile operators. We find that prices decrease for mobile operators involved in RAN sharing agreement due to cost reductions. In a competitive environment where operators compete, MNOs not involved in RAN sharing also lower their prices in a Nash equilibrium. We further evaluate the consumer welfare consequence of the presence of RAN sharing, and find that the RAN sharing enhanced the consumer surplus by generating lower prices for all mobile operators.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivaldi, Marc & Aimene, Louise & Jeanjean, Francois & Liang, Julienne, 2021. "The impact of RAN sharing," 23rd ITS Biennial Conference, Online Conference / Gothenburg 2021. Digital societies and industrial transformations: Policies, markets, and technologies in a post-Covid world 238031, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:itsb21:238031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mobile telecommunications; network sharing; competition; consumer welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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