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Words or deeds - what matters? Experience of recentralization in Russian security agencies

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  • Libman, Alexander
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    Abstract

    The paper discusses the relative importance of the 'real' political actions versus the changes of symbolic nature in the bargaining over devolution, studying the case of personnel decentralization in security agencies in Russia in 2000-2007. While in the 1990s under Boris Yeltsin regional branches of federal ministries in Russia were mostly captured by regional governors, allowing them to pass acts directly contradicting federal law, in 2000s the administration of Vladimir Putin gradually replaced the heads of regional branches by new bureaucrats, supposedly without any connections to the region. The results differ for different security agencies; however, the paper finds, surprisingly, that in several cases the appointment decisions were robustly influenced rather by symbolic gestures made by regional governments in the earlier bargaining process than by the actual devolution policies of the regions. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Frankfurt School of Finance and Management in its series Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series with number 148.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:148

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    Keywords: Devolution; bargaining; transition economies;

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    1. Lorenz Blume & Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 238-264, September.
    2. Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
    3. Edward C. Norton & Hua Wang & Chunrong Ai, 2004. "Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, StataCorp LP, vol. 4(2), pages 154-167, June.
    4. Robert Young, 2004. "Secession as Revolution," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 373-395.
    5. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization," MPRA Paper 15854, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Elinder, Mikael & Jordahl, Henrik & Poutvaara, Panu, 2008. "Selfish and Prospective: Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 770, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    7. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2007. "Political Autonomy and Independence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena, University of Siena 013, University of Siena.
    8. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
    9. Elena Jarocinska, 2008. "Are Intergovernmental Grants Tactical? The Evidence from Russia," CASE Network Studies and Analyses, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research 0361, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    10. Croson, Rachel & Boles, Terry & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2003. "Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 143-159, June.
    11. Vladimir Popov, 2004. "Fiscal Federalism in Russia: Rules versus Electoral Politics," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 46(4), pages 515-541, December.
    12. Forsythe, Robert & Kennan, John & Sopher, Barry, 1991. "An Experimental Analysis of Strikes in Bargaining Games with One-Sided Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 253-78, March.
    13. Arzaghi, Mohammad & Henderson, J. Vernon, 2005. "Why countries are fiscally decentralizing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1157-1189, July.
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    Cited by:
    1. Harhoff, Dietmar & Mueller, Elisabeth & Van Reenen, John, 2012. "What are the channels for technology sourcing? Panel data evidence from German companies," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management 187, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    2. Inklaar, Robert & Koetter, Michael & Noth, Felix, 2012. "Who's afraid of big bad banks? Bank competition, SME, and industry growth," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management 197, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    3. Libman, Alexander & Kozlov, Vladimir & Schultz, André, 2012. "Roving bandits in action: Outside option and governmental predation in autocracies," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management 190, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    4. Kostka, Genia & Moslener, Ulf & Andreas, Jan G., 2011. "Barriers to energy efficiency improvement: Empirical evidence from small-and-medium sized enterprises in China," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management 178, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    5. Yu, Xiaofan, 2011. "A spatial interpretation of the persistency of China's provincial inequality," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management 171, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    6. Boeing, Philipp & Mueller, Elisabeth & Sandner, Philipp, 2012. "What makes Chinese firms productive? Learning from indigenous and foreign sources of knowledge," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management 196, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
    7. Böing, Philipp & Müller, Elisabeth, 2012. "Technological Capabilities of Chinese Enterprises: Who is Going to Compete Abroad?," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association 62081, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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