Game theory, Strategies and the convoluted triangle - India, Pakistan, Kashmir

Using the lens of game theory, the paper attempts to describe the ways in which it can enhance our understanding of international relations and real-world events. The author argues that the inherent instability in the game of Kashmir is due to contrasting approaches towards the game by India and Pakistan, that is, infinite versus finite respectively. To exhibit the games being played and their nature, the incidents and statements by the Prime Ministers of both the nation's post-Pulwama incident were scrutinized and decrypted using game theory. The analysis revealed that Pakistan plays the game of Mutual distrust, Chicken and Bullying while India plays the timing games. Further, both the nations play deterrence games, however, their approaches differ – classical versus perfect. Also, the frequent defection of Pakistan from mutual cooperation point in iterated prisoners dilemma inflicts dynamics between the games – shifting it to mutual distrust and to chicken resulting in tensions. Therefore, the author asserts that from a game theoretic perspective, the stability can be achieved in the long run only by complementing table talks with strict policies against Pakistan sponsored cross border terrorism. These games have been found to fit the observed story of relations between India and Pakistan, with the recent involvement of China. It also briefly discusses the role of clandestine services in strategy determination in modern information warfare.