We propose a model of the widely held firm where management may behave on behalf of shareholders even without external controls. The model shows that there exists a corporate governance mechanism inside the firm where workers are employed on a long-term basis. When effort of young workers depends on managerial decision-making, they give implicit pressure on the managers, which may substitute control by shareholders. If this mechanism works fairly well, it is optimal for shareholders to leave the firm autonomous. We also discuss how the firm's internal factors (such as retention rate and business information sharing) and external environments (such as product market competition and labor market rigidity) affect the efficacy of this internal governance mechanism.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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