Learning, Non-equilibrium Beliefs, and Non-pecuniary Payoffs in an Experimental Game
AbstractWe present and estimate a parametric learning model of players' dynamic and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs about other players'social preferences using the data from the four-country ultimatum game experiments of Roth et al. (1991). The model allows for each of the three leading factors that have been considered in the literature on these games: random utility, non-pecuniary preferences, and learning. We find evidence that in the US and in Israel, the estimated beliefs of proposers are stationary and out-of-equilibrium, that in Slovenia, they are in equilibrium, and that in Japan, they change from period to period and move away from equilibrium over time. On average, proposers and responders have negative regard for each other's monetary payoffs in all countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 00/59.
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- Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Klaus G. Zauner, 2003. "Learning, non-equilibrium beliefs, and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 263-288, 09.
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C19 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Other
- C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
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- NEP-ALL-2001-01-21 (All new papers)
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- Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Georg WeizsÃ¤cker, 2004.
"Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0614, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Zauner, Klaus G., 2002. "The existence of equilibrium in games with randomly perturbed payoffs and applications to experimental economics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 115-120, September.
- Maria M. Wihardja, 2010. "Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions: Positive Equilibrium Analysis, Incentive Mechanism Design, And Empirical Study," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 35(1), pages 35-57, March.
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Games and Economic Behavior,
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