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Learning, Non-equilibrium Beliefs, and Non-pecuniary Payoffs in an Experimental Game

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  • Miguel Costa-Gomes
  • Klaus G. Zauner
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Abstract

We present and estimate a parametric learning model of players' dynamic and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs about other players'social preferences using the data from the four-country ultimatum game experiments of Roth et al. (1991). The model allows for each of the three leading factors that have been considered in the literature on these games: random utility, non-pecuniary preferences, and learning. We find evidence that in the US and in Israel, the estimated beliefs of proposers are stationary and out-of-equilibrium, that in Slovenia, they are in equilibrium, and that in Japan, they change from period to period and move away from equilibrium over time. On average, proposers and responders have negative regard for each other's monetary payoffs in all countries.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 00/59.

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Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:00/59

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  1. MIGUEL A. COSTA-GOMES & GEORG WEIZSÄCKER, 2008. "Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(3), pages 729-762, 07.
  2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2005. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Discussion Papers 66, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Georg Weizsäcker, 2004. "Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games," ISER Discussion Paper 0614, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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