Candidate Stability And Probabilistic Voting Procedures
AbstractWe extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each configuration of the agenda and each profile of voters' preferences over running candidates a probabilistic voting procudure selects a lottery on the set of candidates at stake. Assuming that candidates cannot vote, we show that random dictatorships are the only unanimous probabilistic voting procedures that never provide unilateral incentives for the candidates to leave the ballot independently of the composition of the agenda. However, more flexible rules can be divised if we focus on the stability of specific agendas.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 667.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2006. "Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 657-677, 04.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2001.
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Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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