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International Capital Tax Evasion and the Foreign Tax Credit Puzzle

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Author Info
Scharf, Kimberley Ann

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of international tax evasion for the choice of an optimal foreign tax credit by a capital exporting region. Since a foreign tax credit raises the opportunity cost of concealing foreign source income, it can be employed to discourage evasion activity. The existence of international tax evasion possibilities could thus help rationalize a choice of tax credit in excess of a deduction-equivalent credit level. Our analysis shows that, under certain conditions, the presence of international tax evasion can indeed result in a higher optimal tax credit for a capital exporting country, but the conditions for this result to hold are quite restrictive. We find that : (i) although an increase in the foreign tax credit unambiguously reduces evasion activity per unit of exported capital, it also encourages exports, and may thus result in higher evasion costs ; (ii) the presence of evasion reduces the "compounding" effect of the double taxation of foreign source income, thereby reducing the need for a foreign tax credit ; (iii) by making residence based taxes distortionary, the presence of international tax evasion raises the marginal cost of the public funds that are obtained through domestic taxes, and hence raises the social cost of a foreign credit.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 434.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:434

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Related research
Keywords: Optimal Taxation ; Tax Evasion;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion

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  1. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 2002. "Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(5), pages 567-589, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-21.


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