Tax Competition through Tax Evasion
AbstractIn the present paper, 1 analyse the competitive behaviour of benevolent governments in the presence of (capital) income tax evasion when information exchange is not possible. My approach is to introduce a cost of evasion function into an otherwise standard tax competition model and to explore three variants of the basic tax competition cum evasion game. Two distinct justifications for tax harmonisation emerge. First, harmonisation of taxation at the source can be supported with the usual spill-over argument that is at the core of the tax competition literature. This kind of argument does not apply to the harmonisation of residence-based taxes, however. Second, in a strategic situation where a tax haven facilitates tax evasion by citizens of the rest of the world, countries may find it to their advantage to coordinate their residence-based tax policies as well.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics in its journal Journal of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 221 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Tax competition; tax evasion; tax havens;
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