Intergenerational transfers in rural households: A game theoretical approach
AbstractThe household membership decision is viewed as a “research project” where the offspring invests in human and non human capital to influence the probability of finding an alternative to the parental household. The problem is formulated as a differential game between a selfish offspring and altruistic parents. The solution is consistent with facts” such as the “flexibility of inheritance systems” and the “generational fragmentation” of the family property when the economic opportunities expand outside the parental household.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Labor and Demography with number 0503004.
Date of creation: 13 Mar 2005
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intergenerational transfers; rural households; game theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Américo M. S. Carvalho Mendes, 2007. "Intergenerational transfers in rural households: A game theoretical approach," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 03, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto).
- J - Labor and Demographic Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-16 (All new papers)
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