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Modeling Electricity Auctions

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Author Info

  • David Harbord

    (Market Analysis Ltd)

  • Natalia Fabra

    (IDEI)

  • Nils-Henrik von der Fehr

    (University of Oslo)

Abstract

The recent debates over discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere have revealed an incomplete understanding of the limitations of some popular auction models when applied to real-world electricity markets. This has led certain regulatory authorities to prefer discriminatory auctions on the basis of reasoning from models which are not directly applicable to any existing electricity market. Vickrey auctions, although often recommended by economists, have also been ignored in these debates. This article describes the approach which we believe should be taken to analyzing these issues.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0206/0206001.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0206001.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 12 Jun 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0206001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on PC-MS WORD; pages: 9
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: electricity markets; auctions; Vickrey auctions;

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Cited by:
  1. Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor, 2004. "Market Power in the Spanish Electricity Auction," DFAEII Working Papers 2005-04, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  2. Rahmatallah Poudineh & Tooraj Jamasb, 2013. "Distributed Generation Storage, Demand Response, and Energy Efficiency as Alternatives to Grid Capacity Enhancement," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1356, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  3. Zou, Xiaoyan, 2009. "Double-sided auction mechanism design in electricity based on maximizing social welfare," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4231-4239, November.
  4. Crawford, Gregory S. & Crespo, Joseph & Tauchen, Helen, 2007. "Bidding asymmetries in multi-unit auctions: Implications of bid function equilibria in the British spot market for electricity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1233-1268, December.
  5. Francesco Gullì, 2011. "The interaction between emissions trading and energy and competition policies," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/20, European University Institute.
  6. O'Mahoney, Amy & Denny, Eleanor, 2011. "Electricity Prices and Generator Behaviour in Gross Pool Electricity Markets," MPRA Paper 34847, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Ping Zhang, 2006. "A Complete Characterization of Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Uniform Price IPO Auctions," Discussion Papers 2006-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  8. Müller, Gernot & Rammerstorfer, Margarethe, 2008. "A theoretical analysis of procurement auctions for tertiary control in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 2620-2627, July.
  9. Espinosa Alejos, María Paz & Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor, 2005. "A Supply Function Competition Model for the Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market," DFAEII Working Papers 2005-18, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  10. Baldursson , Fridrik M. & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts in Risky Markets," Memorandum 01/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics.

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