Modeling Electricity Auctions
AbstractThe recent debates over discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere have revealed an incomplete understanding of the limitations of some popular auction models when applied to real-world electricity markets. This has led certain regulatory authorities to prefer discriminatory auctions on the basis of reasoning from models which are not directly applicable to any existing electricity market. Vickrey auctions, although often recommended by economists, have also been ignored in these debates. This article describes the approach which we believe should be taken to analyzing these issues.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0206001.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 12 Jun 2002
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on PC-MS WORD; pages: 9
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electricity markets; auctions; Vickrey auctions;
Other versions of this item:
- Harbord, David & Fabra, Natalia & Fehr, Nils-Henrik Von der, . "Modeling Electricity Auctions," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/5015, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- C43 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Index Numbers and Aggregation
- C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-07-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2002-07-31 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2002-07-31 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2002-07-31 (Regulation)
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