Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies
AbstractThis paper compares the political support for a targeted and a universalistic welfare policy in a model in which incomes are stochastic (so that welfare policies have an insurance benefit) and unequal ex ante (so that welfare policies have a redistributive effect). With self-interested voting, low benefits may so reduce the probability of receiving benefits for the majority that the majority prefers to reduce benefits even further to zero. In contrast, a majority of self-interested voters always supports positive welfare benefits when the policy is universalistic. If voters are somewhat altruistic, the difference between the equilibrium level of benefits with a universalistic and targeted policy diminishes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University in its series IPR working papers with number 97-2.
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- Moene, K.O. & Wallerstein, M., 1997. "Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 17/1997, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
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- Karl Ove Moene & Michael Wallerstein, 2001. "Targeting and political support for welfare spending," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 3-24, 03.
- Anderberg, Dan, 1999. "Determining the mix of public and private provision of insurance by majority rule," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 417-440, September.
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