The Economic Value of Regulated Disclosure: Evidence from the Banking Sector
AbstractThe study examines the economic consequences of regulated disclosure in the banking sector, focusing on its impacts on the stability of banking systems. In a cross-country study of banking systems across 49 countries in the 90s, I find that banking crises are less likely in countries with greater regulated disclosure and transparency. Specifically, banking systems are less vulnerable to crisis if supported by financial reporting regimes characterized by (i) more comprehensive disclosure (ii) more timely financial reporting (iii) more informative reporting, and (iv) more credible financial disclosure. To the extent that banking crises are costly, the paper documents the positive impact of accounting information to the real sector of the economy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number wp875.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2006
Date of revision:
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Regulated disclosure; informativeness; timeliness; credibility; banking crisis;
Other versions of this item:
- Tadesse, Solomon, 2006. "The economic value of regulated disclosure: Evidence from the banking sector," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 32-70.
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
- M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Auditing
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
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- Rudiger Ahrend & Antoine Goujard, 2012. "International Capital Mobility and Financial Fragility - Part 3. How Do Structural Policies Affect Financial Crisis Risk?: Evidence from Past Crises Across OECD and Emerging Economies," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 966, OECD Publishing.
- Ronald Zhao & Yihong He, 2014. "The accounting implication of banking deregulation: an event study of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999)," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 449-468, April.
- Bowo Setiyono & Amine Tarazi, 2014. "Disclosure, ownership structure and bank risk: Evidence from Asia," Working Papers hal-00947590, HAL.
- Solomon Tadesse, 2006. "Banking Fragility & Disclosure: International Evidence," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp874, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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