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Contrasting future paths for an evolving global climate regime

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  • Barrett, Scott
  • Toman, Michael

Abstract

This paper explores two different conceptions of how an emerging climate regime might evolve to strengthen incentives for more vigorous cooperation in mitigating global climate change. One is the paradigm that has figured most prominently in negotiations to this point: the establishment of targets and timetables for countries to limit their aggregate greenhouse gas emissions. The other approach consists of a variety of loosely coordinated smaller scale agreements, each one of which addresses a different aspect of the challenge, and is enforced in its own way. The primary conclusion is that an agreement of the first type may be more cost-effective, but that a system of agreements of the second type would likely sustain more abatement overall.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 5164.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2010
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5164

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Keywords: Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases; Climate Change Economics; Montreal Protocol; Environmental Economics&Policies; Transport Economics Policy&Planning;

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Cited by:
  1. Mattoo, Aaditya & Subramanian, Arvind, 2012. "Equity in Climate Change: An Analytical Review," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1083-1097.
  2. Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, 2010. "International Climate Games: From Caps to Cooperation," Papers of Peter Cramton 10icg, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2010.
  3. Elisabeth Gsottbauer & Jeroen den Bergh, 2013. "Bounded rationality and social interaction in negotiating a climate agreement," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 225-249, September.
  4. World Bank & United Nations, 2010. "Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters : The Economics of Effective Prevention," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 2512, August.
  5. Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "A model of dynamic climate governance: dream big, win small," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 107-125, May.

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