Shifting tax burdens through exemptions and evasion - an empirical investigation of Uganda
AbstractThe authors look at how prevalent tax exemptions, and evasion are among businesses in Uganda, how they translate into actual tax burdens for firms of different sizes, and how the tax administration attempts to ensure compliance. Despite tax reforms undertaken in 1995-97 to increase the efficiency, and equity of the tax system, and its administration, exemptions, and evasion during this three-year period remained widespread, and the dispersion of the tax burden did not decrease. The analysis shows that tax evasion is more prevalent among smaller firms, that taxexemptions are more common among larger firms, and that medium-size firms tend to shoulder a disproportionate share of the total tax burden.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2735.
Date of creation: 31 Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Small Scale Enterprise; Public Sector Economics&Finance; Tax Policy and Administration; Small and Medium Size Enterprises; Microfinance; Public Sector Economics&Finance; Tax Policy and Administration; National Governance; Taxation&Subsidies; Small Scale Enterprise;
Other versions of this item:
- Bernard Gauthier & Ritva Reinikka, 2006. "Shifting Tax Burdens through Exemptions and Evasion: an Empirical Investigation of Uganda," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 15(3), pages 373-398, September.
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