IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wap/wpaper/2308.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Fragility of The Condorcet Jury Theorem: Information Aggregation and Preference Aggregation

Author

Listed:
  • Masayuki Odora

    (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University)

Abstract

This study considers a binary election in which imperfectly informed voters have partially conflicting interests. There is an unambiguously correct alternative in some states, while voters disagree on the better alternative in other states. The true state is unknown to anybody, but each voter receives a private signal about the state. This study identifies the circumstances in which the probability that a society utilizing the majority rule reaches the correct decisions does not converge to 1, thus showing the failure of an asymptotic Condorcet Jury Theorem. Moreover, we show that the voting behavior never reflects voters’ private information in the large elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Masayuki Odora, 2024. "Fragility of The Condorcet Jury Theorem: Information Aggregation and Preference Aggregation," Working Papers 2308, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wap:wpaper:2308
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/2024/01/afdafe3804bb119d615ae67fb5c36040-2.pdf
    File Function: First version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elisabeth Schulte, 2012. "Communication in committees: who should listen?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 97-117, January.
    2. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    3. Gerardi, Dino, 2000. "Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 395-406, June.
    4. Daniel Berend & Jacob Paroush, 1998. "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 481-488.
    5. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    6. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1908 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. McLennan, Andrew, 1998. "Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 413-418, June.
    9. Wit, Jorgen, 1998. "Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 364-376, February.
    10. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2013. "Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(3), pages 1229-1247, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jianan Wang, 2021. "Evidence and fully revealing deliberation with non-consequentialist jurors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 515-531, December.
    2. Sourav Bhattacharya & Paulo Barelli, 2013. "A Possibility Theorem on Information Aggregation in Elections," Working Paper 515, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2013.
    3. Xie, Yinxi & Xie, Yang, 2017. "Machiavellian experimentation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 685-711.
    4. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
    5. Elisabeth Schulte, 2010. "Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 97-118, July.
    6. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Lauermann, Stephan, 2022. "Information aggregation in Poisson-elections," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
    7. Yun Wang, 2015. "Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers," Working Papers 2015-03-24, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    8. Hummel, Patrick, 2011. "Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-6, July.
    9. ,, 2016. "Condorcet meets Ellsberg," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
    10. GOERTZ, Johanna & MANIQUET, François, 2013. "Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(3), pages 301-327, July.
    12. Tajika, Tomoya, 2022. "Voting on tricky questions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 380-389.
    13. Patrick Hummel, 2012. "Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 595-608, March.
    14. Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2012. "Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(1), pages 91-125, June.
    15. Gratton, Gabriele, 2014. "Pandering and electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
    16. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation," NBER Working Papers 29005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin, 2021. "When voters like to be right: An analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with mixed motives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    18. Svetlana Kosterina, 2023. "Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 493-522, February.
    19. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Xefteris, Dimitris, 2021. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," SocArXiv ubk7p, Center for Open Science.
    20. Tajika, Tomoya, 2018. "Collective Mistakes: Intuition Aggregation for a Trick Question under Strategic Voting," Discussion Paper Series 674, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; Information aggregation; partially conflicting interests; Condorcet Jury Theorem;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wap:wpaper:2308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Haruko Noguchi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/spwasjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.