Luck Egalitarianism, Relational Egalitarianism, and the Harshness Objection: Experimental Approach

Elizabeth Anderson accused luck egalitarianism of having harshness implications when it is adopted as a redistributive policy. Anderson supported democratic or relational egalitarianism that requires the satisfaction of basic capabilities for democratic relationships among citizens, regardless of their responsibility for their current positions. Subsequently, there has been a debate over luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism; however, these positions are fairly close by virtue of their reliance on our intuitions, a fact that Anderson's original arguments echo. This paper thus examines Anderson's arguments against luck egalitarianism and for democratic egalitarianism using an online survey method. The results show that, first, for ordinary people, the luck consideration is as important as the basic capabilities consideration. This finding runs contrary to Anderson's claim. Second, while real people consider the degree of compensation through the factors of causality (the degree of chosen results) and responsibility (the degree of responsibility for the consequences), the lack of basic capabilities directs them to determine how much victims of bad luck should be compensated. This suggests that the effort to reconcile luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism is on the right track. These findings are relevant to the recent shift of egalitarian philosophy.