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The Debt Crisis and the European Central Bank’s Role of Lender of Last Resort

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  • Carlo Panico
  • Francesco Purificato

Abstract

While the media and some professional blogs propose austerity policies because the European debt crisis is due to the misuse of public finances by some national authorities, this paper suggests that the existence of national conflicts within the ECB’s governing bodies is the main cause of the crisis. By examining the interventions of the Eurosystem in favour of the Government sector, the paper argues that fiscal policies enhancing growth and reductions in the interest rates on sovereign securities are needed. This requires minimising moral hazard regarding the behaviour of the national political authorities. The literature on the institutional organization of policy coordination contains rich material for the identification of sensible solutions to this problem. Yet, the unfounded fears spread by the media among the taxpayers make it difficult to apply them.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlo Panico & Francesco Purificato, 2013. "The Debt Crisis and the European Central Bank’s Role of Lender of Last Resort," Working Papers wp306, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
  • Handle: RePEc:uma:periwp:wp306
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Carlo Panico & Francesco Purificato, 2013. "Policy coordination, conflicting national interests and the European debt crisis," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(3), pages 585-608.
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    13. Antonio Fat·s & Ilian Mihov, 2003. "On Constraining Fiscal Policy Discretion in EMU," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 19(1), pages 112-131.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chee-Heong Quah, 2016. "A Diagnostic on the West African Monetary Union," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 84(1), pages 129-148, March.
    2. Eric M. Leeper, 2015. "Fiscal Analysis is Darned Hard," CAEPR Working Papers 2015-021, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    3. Roumeen Islam, 2017. "Growth after Crisis in Europe: An Interdependence of Macroeconomic and Structural Policies," Cyprus Economic Policy Review, University of Cyprus, Economics Research Centre, vol. 11(2), pages 19-62, December.

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