Endogenous Spillovers under Cournot Rivalry and Co-opetitive Behaviors
AbstractWe develop a model of Cournot oligopolists with endogenous R§D spillovers where a specific type of co-opetition is introduced. The two principle factors of R§D spillovers, namely the absorptive capacity and the information-sharing parameter, are assumed to depend positively on the percentage of knowledge the firm chooses to codify and reveal. It is shown that identical firms that are rivals on the final good market do not necessarily choose the lowest level for the spillover parameters. Furthermore, there is some justification for a subsidy to knowledge codification and information-sharing. However, the latter is obtained under conditions on firms' technologies and spillover functions which ensure the emergence of symmetric solutions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2003-10.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: PEGE. 61, Aven. de la Forêt-Noire 67000 Strasbourg
Phone: +33 3 68 85 20 69
Fax: +33 3 68 85 20 70
Web page: http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/
More information through EDIRC
cost reduction; endogenous spillovers; information sharing; absorptive capacity; co-opetition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Julien PENIN, 2005. "Open knowledge disclosure, incomplete information and collective innovations," Working Papers of BETA 2005-10, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.