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Some results on stability concepts for matching models

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Abstract

We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the non-existence of unsatis ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game.

Suggested Citation

  • Ester Camiña Centeno, 2010. "Some results on stability concepts for matching models," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 1004, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:1004
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    File URL: https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/11835/1/1004.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles Blair, 1988. "The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 13(4), pages 619-628, November.
    2. Alvin E. Roth, 1985. "Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 379-389, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Assignment; Stability.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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