Some results on stability concepts for matching models
AbstractWe consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the non-existence of unsatis ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales in its series Documentos del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico with number 1004.
Length: pages 12
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Matching; Assignment; Stability.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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- Ester Cami?, 2002.
"A Generalized Assignment Game,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
514.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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