Global Climate Change and the Funding of Adaptation
AbstractMitigation and adaptation are the most important strategies in combating global climate change. It is expected that in a post Kyoto world industrialized countries have to engage in greenhouse gas abatement, and to support developing countries in adapting to climate change. Within the framework of a non-cooperative Nash game we analyze, whether funding adaptation is incentive compatible in the sense that it stipulates mitigation. In particular it is the aim of this paper to discuss: (1) How does foreign funding of adaptation affect mitigation and regional welfare? (2) Under which conditions is it economically rational to fund adaptation in developing regions? We find that, if strict complementarity between adaptation and mitigation exists, funding adaptation increases both global mitigation and the donors' welfare, but negatively affects the recipients' welfare. The later only benefit, if maladaptation or adaptation, which is neutral to mitigation, is funded, which, however, makes the donors worse off.
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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Climate change; mitigation and adaptation; funding of private goods;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2008-12-07 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2008-12-07 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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