The Timing of Climate Agreements under Multiple Externalities
AbstractWe study the potential of cooperation in global emission abatements with multiple externalities. Using a two-country model without side-payments, we identify the strategic effects under different timing regimes of cooperation. We obtain a positive complementarity effect of long-term cooperation in abatement on R&D levels that boosts potential bene?t of long-term cooperation and a redistributive effect that destabilizes long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric. We show that whether and what type of cooperation is sustainable, depends crucially on the kind rather than on the magnitude of asymmetries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 366.
Date of creation: Nov 2011
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climate treaty; timing of cooperation; multiple externalities; long-term commitment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2012-07-29 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-07-29 (Environmental Economics)
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- May Elsayyad & Florian Morath, 2013. "Technology Transfers for Climate Change," CESifo Working Paper Series 4521, CESifo Group Munich.
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