Vicarious Liability and the Intensity Principle
AbstractThe present paper provides an economic analysis of vicarious liability that takes information rents and monitoring costs to be borne by the principal explicitly into account. In the presence of information rents or if the principal is wealth constrained herself, vicarious liability need not generate efficient precaution incentives. Rather, precaution incentives turn out to depend on the exact quantum of damages specified by courts. I shall compare incentives under three damages regimes: strict liability, the traditional negligence rule, and proportional liability. To do so, I make use of the intensity principle that allows to rank damages regimes based on the monotonicity of differences of the principal's expected payof f as a function of induced precaution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 364.
Date of creation: Oct 2011
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More information through EDIRC
vicarious liability; precaution incentives; judgement-proof principals and agents; discrepancy between private and social costs;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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- Stremitzer, Alexander & Tabbach, Avraham, 2009.
"Insolvency and Biased Standards--The Case for Proportional Liability,"
75, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Stremitzer, Alexander & Tabbach, Avraham, 2009. "Insolvency and Biased Standards - The Case for Proportional Liability," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 289, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Stremitzer, Alexander & Tabbach, Avraham, 2009. "Insolvency and Biased Standards--The Case for Proportional Liability," Working Papers 75r, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter.
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