This is a matching model with two types of skills, low and high, where the high skill is acquired through training in schools, the introduction of which is the main innovation of this paper. The search externalities make the competitive equilibrium differ from the social planners steady state and in order to make the decentralized economy efficient, some public policies are studied along with their viability.
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Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number
CIRJE-F-353.
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James Albrecht & Susan Vroman, 2002.
"A Matching Model with Endogenous Skill Requirements,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 283-305, February.
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