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The Political Economy of Financial Fragility

Author

Listed:
  • Erik Feijen

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Enrico Perotti

    (University of Amsterdam, World Bank, and CEPR)

Abstract

While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on enforcement of investor protection, which may be structured so as to block funding for new entrants, or limit their access to refinance after a shock. This forces inefficient default and exit by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen financial fragility. After large external shocks, borrowers from the political elite in very corrupt countries may successfully lobby for weak enforcement, and retain control of collateral. We provide evidence that industry exit rates and profit margins after banking crises are higher in the most corrupt countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Feijen & Enrico Perotti, 2005. "The Political Economy of Financial Fragility," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-115/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050115
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    Cited by:

    1. Moskalev, Sviatoslav A., 2010. "Foreign ownership restrictions and cross-border markets for corporate control," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 48-70, February.
    2. Bonfiglioli, Alessandra, 2008. "Financial integration, productivity and capital accumulation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 337-355, December.
    3. Beck, T.H.L., 2011. "The Role of Finance in Economic Development : Benefits, Risks, and Politics," Discussion Paper 2011-141, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Feijen, Erik, 2005. "Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3660, The World Bank.
    5. Enrico Perotti & Paolo Volpin, 2007. "Investor Protection and Entry," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-006/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Susan Schroeder, 2009. "Defining and detecting financial fragility: New Zealand's experience," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 36(3), pages 287-307, February.
    7. Chari, Anusha & Gupta, Nandini, 2008. "Incumbents and protectionism: The political economy of foreign entry liberalization," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 633-656, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Politics; Lobbying; Financial Development; Investor protection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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