Efficiency and Distributional Aspects of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Pollution: An Empirical Analysis
AbstractThe cost-saving advantages of market mechanisms such as tradable permits and emission taxes have been promoted by economists since the early 1970s. The research reported in this paper simulates their application to the Forth Estuary in Scotland comparing such policies with regulation of output levels for emissions. Potential resource cost savings are identified under two alternative targets. However, there are serious obstacles to the attainment of these savings. We also consider the distributional aspects of the policy alternatives.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Stirling, Division of Economics in its series Working Papers Series with number 92/2.
Date of creation: Jan 1992
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Division of Economics, University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA
Phone: +44 (0)1786 467473
Fax: +44 (0)1786 467469
Web page: http://www.econ.stir.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Hanley, Nick D & Moffatt, Ian, 1993. "Efficiency and Distributional Aspects of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Pollution: An Empirical Analysis," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 40(1), pages 69-87, February.
- Hanley Hanley, 1992. "Efficiency and Distributional Aspects of Market Mechanisms in the Control of Pollution: An Empirical analysis," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 842, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nils-Henrik MÃ¸rch von der Fehr, 1993.
"Tradable emission rights and strategic interaction,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(2), pages 129-151, April.
- Morch von der Fehr, N-H., 1991. "Tradable Emission Rights and Strategic Interaction," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 11/1991, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Kampas, Athanasios & Mamalis, Spyridon, 2006. "Assessing the Distributional Impacts of Transferable Pollution Permits: The Case of Phosphorus Pollution Management at a River Basin Scale," Agricultural Economics Review, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, Greek Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 7(2), August.
- Tao Wang, 2006. "Cost Effectiveness in River Management: Evaluation of Integrated River Policy System in Tidal Ouse," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2006.142, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Dafna Eshel, 2005. "Optimal Allocation of Tradable Pollution Rights and Market Structures," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 205-223, 09.
- Kampas, Athanasios & White, Ben, 2003. "Selecting permit allocation rules for agricultural pollution control: a bargaining solution," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2-3), pages 135-147, December.
- Kjell SunnevÃ¥g, 2003. "Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(3), pages 385-400, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Liam Delaney).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.