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Pareto-efficient climate agreements

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Author Info
Geir B. Asheim and Bjart Holtsmark (Statistics Norway)

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Abstract

Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a “narrow but deep” treaty with a “broad but shallow” treaty.

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File URL: http://www.ssb.no/publikasjoner/DP/pdf/dp505.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number 505.

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Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:505

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Related research
Keywords: Climate; non-cooperative game-theory; repeated games; weakly renegotiation-proof agreements;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
F53 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

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