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Public money as a store of value, heterogeneous beliefs and banks: implications of CBDC

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  • Muñoz, Manuel A.
  • Soons, Oscar

Abstract

The bulk of cash is held for store of value purposes, with such holdings sharply increasing in times of high economic uncertainty and only a fraction of the population choosing to hoard cash. We develop a Diamond and Dybvig model with public money as a store of value and heterogeneous beliefs about bank stability that accounts for this evidence. Only consumers who are sufficiently pessimistic about bank stability hold cash. The introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) as a store of value lowers the storage cost of public money and induces partial bank disintermediation, which is nevertheless mitigated by an increase in relative maturity transformation. This has heterogeneous welfare consequences across the population. While cash holders always benefit by switching to CBDC, each of all other consumers may be better off or not depending on the probability of a bank run, her (and all others’) belief about such probability and the degree of technological superiority of CBDC. JEL Classification: E41, E58, G11, G21

Suggested Citation

  • Muñoz, Manuel A. & Soons, Oscar, 2024. "Public money as a store of value, heterogeneous beliefs and banks: implications of CBDC," ESRB Working Paper Series 146, European Systemic Risk Board.
    • Handle: RePEc:srk:srkwps:2024146
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    File URL: https://www.esrb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/wp/esrb.wp146.en.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Andolfatto, 2021. "Assessing the Impact of Central Bank Digital Currency on Private Banks," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(634), pages 525-540.
    2. Assenmacher, Katrin & Berentsen, Aleksander & Brand, Claus & Lamersdorf, Nora, 2021. "A unified framework for CBDC design: remuneration, collateral haircuts and quantity constraints," Working Paper Series 2578, European Central Bank.
    3. Ricardo J Caballero & Alp Simsek, 2020. "A Risk-Centric Model of Demand Recessions and Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(3), pages 1493-1566.
    4. Katrin Assenmacher & Franz Seitz & Jörn Tenhofen, 2019. "The demand for Swiss banknotes: some new evidence," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 155(1), pages 1-22, December.
    5. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Alp Simsek & Wei Xiong, 2014. "A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(4), pages 1753-1797.
    6. Meller, Barbara & Soons, Oscar, 2023. "Know your (holding) limits: CBDC, financial stability and central bank reliance," Occasional Paper Series 326, European Central Bank.
    7. Barbara Meller & Oscar Soons, 2023. "Know your (holding) limits: CBDC, financial stability and central bank reliance," Working Papers 771, DNB.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank stability; cash hoarding; central bank digital currency; disagreement; uncertainty shocks; welfare; flight-to-safety;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E41 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Demand for Money
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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