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Finanzintermediaere - Groessennachteile und Spezialisierungsvorteile

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  • Michael Breuer

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    (Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich)

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    Abstract

    Fuer das Entstehen von Finanzintermediaeren existieren in der theoretischen Literatur zahlreiche ueberzeugende Begruendungen, die konsequent zu Ende gedacht allerdings auf einen Finanzintermediaer als natuerliches Monopol hinauslaufen. Beitraege, die Grenzen fuer das Wachstum von Finanzintermediaeren aufzeigen, sind indessen selten. Das vorliegende Papier baut auf einem Modell von Millon und Thakor auf. Die betrachteten Akteure sind die einzelnen Informationsagenten (z.B. Sachbearbeiter) des Finanzintermediaers, die einen gewissen Aufwand fuer das Sammeln von Informationen ueber ihre Kunden betreiben muessen. Zu einer freiwilligen und oekonomisch sinnvollen Zusammenarbeit zwischen ihnen kommt es nur dann, wenn sie im Rahmen ihrer Zusammenarbeit Informationsteilung betreiben koennen. Die wesentlichen neuen Ergebnisse des vorliegenden Beitrags sind, dass es unter heterogenen Informationsagenten nur zu Gruppenbildungen von recht homogenen (spezialisierten) Agenten kommen wird. Zugleich bestehen aber dynamische Anreizwirkungen, durch welche eben diese Homogenitaet innerhalb eines Finanzintermediaers bedroht wird. Die dynamischen Anreizwirkungen innerhalb eines Finanzintermediaers sind nicht nur fuer die begrenzte Groesse von Finanzintermediaeren verantwortlich, sondern koennen sogar den Keim fuer eine spaetere Aufspaltung oder Aufloesung von Finanzintermediaeren bilden.

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    File URL: http://www.soi.uzh.ch/research/wp/1997-2002/wp0103.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2001
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich in its series SOI - Working Papers with number 0103.

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    Length: 32 pages
    Date of creation: Aug 2001
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in Britzelmaier, B. et al. (eds.), Regulierung oder Deregulierung der Finanzmaerkte, 2. Liechtensteinisches Finanzdienstleistungs-Symposium an der Fachhochschule Liechtenstein, Heidelberg, Physica, pages 53-71
    Handle: RePEc:soz:wpaper:0103

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    Keywords: financial intermediaries; economies of scale;

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    References

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    1. Pyle, David H, 1971. "On the Theory of Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 737-47, June.
    2. Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 415-32, July.
    3. V. Cerasi & S. Daltung, 1995. "The Optimal Size of a Bank: Costs and Benefits of Diversification," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano 1995-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    4. Millon, Marcia H & Thakor, Anjan V, 1985. " Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1403-22, December.
    5. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May.
    6. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
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