Product Differentiation and Relative Performance Evaluation in an Asymmetric Duopoly
AbstractIn a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly with asymmetric costs, I show that an increase in the intensity of market competition (product differentiation) increases the absolute weight placed on rival's profit (relative performance) in the managerial compensation scheme for both firms and also increases market concentration. The relatively efficient (larger) firm always places higher weight on rival's performance and obtains higher market share.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 0708.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, P.O. Box 750496, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496
Web page: http://www.smu.edu/economics
Strategic Delegation; Relative Performance; Managerial Compensation; Oligopoly;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-10-06 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-10-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2007-10-06 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2007-10-06 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Nolan Miller & Amit Pazgal, 2002. "Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 51-68.
- Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bo Chen).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.