Strategic delegation and collusion: Do incentive schemes matter?
AbstractThis paper introduces delegation decisions and contracts based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) in the analysis of cartel stability. We follow the approach developed by Lambertini and Trombetta , where manager's compensation combines pro_ts and sales (CPS) instead. Some of our results are similar while others are distinct from those of Lambertini and Trombetta. In particular, we show that collusion under RPE is always harder to sustain than under CPS.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg in its series LSF Research Working Paper Series with number 11-02.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Cartel Stability; Delegation; Relative Performance Evaluation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-05-30 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-05-30 (Industrial Competition)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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