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The BCS, Antitrust and Public Policy

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Author Info
Andrew Zimbalist () (Department of Economics, Smith College)
Abstract

This paper examines the history and the economics of the Bowl Championship Series, in the context of all college bowl games. The evidence suggests that the BCS restricts entry to the FBS conferences that are outside the BCS cartel and that the revenue distribution from the bowl games is highly skewed in favor of the six BCS conferences. The resulting revenue advantage enables the BCS conferences to perpetuate their historical predominance. The BCS selection process is based on a conceptually confused and biased system. The paper discusses the rationale proffered by the BCS for its system and then considers the antitrust arguments against the BCS. It concludes that the outcome of any antitrust claim would be uncertain, which together with the involved expense and time render problematic any antitrust strategy to break up the BCS cartel. Instead, the paper concludes with a call for a legislative solution that would open up the national championship to all FBS conferences, increase output, redistribute revenues more evenly throughout Division I and the rest of the NCAA, and provide more opportunities to college athletes.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Smith College, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009-01.

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Handle: RePEc:smt:wpaper:2009-01

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Web page: http://www.smith.edu/econ/

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.


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