Evolutionary Bargaining with Cooperative Investments
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 with number 308.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2002
Date of revision:
Hold-Up; bargaining; stochastic stability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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