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MFN Clubs and Scheduling Additional Commitments in the GATT: Learning from the GATS

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  • Bernard M. Hoekman
  • Petros C. Mavroidis

Abstract

Scheduling additional commitments for policies affecting trade in goods in the GATT has been plagued by two sources of ambiguity: the treatment of changes introduced unilaterally by members subsequent to an initial commitment, and the treatment of new commitments by WTO members pertaining to nontariff policy measures affecting trade in goods. This is not the case for trade in services, as the GATS makes explicit provision for additional commitments to be scheduled. Neither secondary law, in the form of decisions formally adopted by the WTO membership, nor case law has clarified the situation for trade in goods. This matter is important for the WTO as it determines the feasibility of clubs of countries agreeing to new enforceable policy disciplines that bind only signatories but are applied on a non-discriminatory basis to all WTO members. In this paper, we discuss the legal state of play and the ‘policy space’ that WTO members have to establish new MFN club-based disciplines for nontariff measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 2016. "MFN Clubs and Scheduling Additional Commitments in the GATT: Learning from the GATS," RSCAS Working Papers 2016/06, European University Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2016/06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hoekman, Bernard M. & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2015. "Embracing Diversity: Plurilateral Agreements and the Trading System," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 101-116, January.
    2. Kamal Saggi & Faruk Sengul, 2018. "On the emergence of an MFN club: equal treatment in an unequal world," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 4, pages 76-108, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Grossman, Gene M. & Sykes, Alan O., 2005. "A preference for development: the law and economics of GSP," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 41-67, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, 2016. "Private Standards and the WTO: Reclusive No More," RSCAS Working Papers 2016/17, European University Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade agreements; plurilaterals; WTO; clubs; nontariff measures.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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