A Competitive Theory of Credit Scoring
AbstractWe study how credit scoring impacts the ability of individuals to consumption smooth. Our environment has ex-ante heterogeneity of household types. Credit scoring is interpreted as an intermediary's posterior of a household's type conditional on its bankruptcy and borrowing decisions. The inference problem is whether an observed defaulter is a good type with a bad earnings realization or a bad type. Default adversely affects an agent's credit score and endogenously limits the household's access to unsecured credit
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 823.
Date of creation: 2004
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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Credit Scoring; Default;
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- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
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- Kartik Athreya & Xuan S. Tam & Eric R. Young, 2012.
"A Quantitative Theory of Information and Unsecured Credit,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 153-83, July.
- Kartik Athreya, 2008. "A Quantitative Theory of Information and Unsecured Credit," 2008 Meeting Papers 68, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Kartik Athreya & Xuan S. Tam & Eric R. Young, 2011. "A quantitative theory of information and unsecured credit," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 08-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Jose-Victor Rios-Rull & Xavier Mateos-Planas, 2009.
2009 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics
894, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Athreya, Kartik & Tam, Xuan S. & Young, Eric R., 2009. "Unsecured credit markets are not insurance markets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 83-103, January.
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