Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Persistent Private Information
AbstractWe study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information over idiosyncratic skill shocks. We consider economies in which the skill distribution is first order Markov. We show that there exists a tax system that implements the constrained optimal allocation as competitive equilibrium in a market economy where agents can trade current consumption and risk-free claims to future consumption. Under this system, an agent's tax payments are conditioned only the following observable characteristics: her accumulated stock of claims, or wealth, her labour earnings in the current and past period, and her savings. The optimal tax function is not additively separable in these variables. We show that if the skill process is positively correlated, the marginal tax on savings is increasing in current labor earnings, implying a "savings subsidy" for low skill agents
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 49.
Date of creation: 2004
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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Optimal Taxation; Private Information;
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- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
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- Adriano Rampini & Alberto Bisin, 2005.
"Markets as Beneficial Constraints on the Government,"
2005 Meeting Papers
325, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Bisin, Alberto & Rampini, Adriano A., 2006. "Markets as beneficial constraints on the government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 601-629, May.
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