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Defence Expenditures by Countries in Allied and Adversarial Relationships

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Author Info

  • Neil Bruce

Abstract

This paper models the linkage between a country's national security and the defense spending of its allies and adversaries. The cost of an arms race is introduced into the alliance public good framework of Olson and Zeckhauser. Contrary to their presumption, for a cooperative treaty to increase defense spending in an alliance may make it worse off. Further, even where the treaty makes an alliance better off, such treaty making may constitute a form of prisoner's dilemma for the world as a whole.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 745.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:745

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Related research

Keywords: defence policy ; economic models ; military expenditures;

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Cited by:
  1. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "Optimal law enforcement and the economics of the drug market: Some comments on the Schengen Agreements," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 521-535, December.
  2. Andreou, Andreas S. & Zombanakis, George A., 2003. "Intelligent information systems for defence problems," MPRA Paper 38637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Gupta, Rupayan, 2010. "Changing Threat Perceptions and the Efficient Provisioning of International Security," MPRA Paper 24016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Jayaraman, Rajshri & Kanbur, Ravi, 1999. "International Public Goods and the Case for Foreign Aid," Working Papers 127684, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
  5. A. S. Andreou & K. E. Parsopoulos & M. N. Vrahatis & G. A. Zombanakis, 2002. "Optimal versus required defence expenditure: The case of the Greek-Turkish arms race," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 329-347.
  6. Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information," Departmental Working Papers 0805, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008.
  7. Chang, Wen-ya & Tsai, Hsueh-fang & Lai, Ching-chong, 2006. "Effects of an anticipated expansion in international public goods on public capital accumulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(12), pages 2859-2874, December.

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