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Conduite de la politique budgétaire: enseignements des expériences internationales et évidences des fonctions de réaction
[Fiscal policy in Morocco: lessons from international experiences and evidence of reaction functions]

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  • lahlou, kamal

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of fiscal policy in Morocco in order to identify its targets particularly in terms of growth, preservation of macroeconomic balances and social cohesion. In this respect, three reaction functions have been estimated dealing with the instruments of the primary balance, budgetary expenditures and tax revenues. Estimates of the reaction function of the primary balance instrument have revealed that the budgetary authorities seem to have a priority objective of growth as evidenced by the significant value of the parameter linked to the output gap and whose positive sign points to a certain procyclicality. Although the debt stabilization parameter has proved significant, the low weight it displays confirms that the deficit instrument did not play a major role in stabilizing borrowing. For their part, the parameters of the budgetary expenditure rule also show a certain priority given to economic growth. This conclusion seems to be consistent with the stage of development in Morocco where the needs for investment in economic and social infrastructure remain significant. Although debt sustainability only comes in second place, the value of the parameter it displays in the expenditure rule suggests significant but moderate interest. Finally, it would seem difficult to conclude that a fiscal tax revenue rule is effective. Key words: fiscal policy, fiscal rules, fiscal reaction functions.

Suggested Citation

  • lahlou, kamal, 2017. "Conduite de la politique budgétaire: enseignements des expériences internationales et évidences des fonctions de réaction [Fiscal policy in Morocco: lessons from international experiences and evide," MPRA Paper 98023, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:98023
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal policy; fiscal rules; fiscal reaction functions.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models
    • C36 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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