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Bank-based investing RoSCA for Islamic finance: a new alternative to drain households savings and reduce financial exclusion

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  • BOUSALAM, Issam
  • HAMZAOUI, Moustapha

Abstract

On the arrival of the new banking law in Morocco, in august 2015, conventional banks and their foreign rivals will finally have the possibility to create their subsidiaries dedicated to microcredit, participative finance and payment, and hence, supply the market with new Islamic financial solutions for money saving and financing. In order to drain the substantial households savings escaping to classic banks, and consequently, gain ground among these latter, we think that those new Islamic finance operators should target, in almost equal proportions, people with no access to formal financing and those with religious convictions about interest rate prohibition in Islam. For this purpose, we conceptualized an innovative bank based model of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations that allows its members to invest their savings by means of the bank, and raise freeinterest rate loans with no application and management fees. In fact, The conception of this model relied on the results of a survey questionnaire we administered among 725 subjects from different social categories in Morocco to comprehend the inherent features of this informal practice (RoSCA) locally called "Daret". The first part of the answers gave us a basic data we used, by means of the two-way ANOVA (Analysis of the variance), to determine which social characteristics interact together to motivate a person to join a RoSCA. As for the second part of the answers, it gave us insights into the functioning of traditional RoSCAs in Morocco and their members preferences and perceptions on different scales. After all, we based on these findings to conceptualize the model taking into account both equity between members and sustainability of the operation. Additionally, unlike the traditional types of RoSCAs that rely on confidence and social links between members, this bank-based investing RoSCA allows people with no prior cognition to be gathered. This by introducing the bank as a guarantor and withdrawing, temporarily, a deposit for default risk to estimate by means of a risk-rating matrix we proposed. The model is, also, found to be more attractive regarding its real economy promotion through investment, risk sharing process, and integration of financially excluded households.

Suggested Citation

  • BOUSALAM, Issam & HAMZAOUI, Moustapha, 2015. "Bank-based investing RoSCA for Islamic finance: a new alternative to drain households savings and reduce financial exclusion," MPRA Paper 67510, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Oct 2015.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:67510
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn, 1993. "The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 792-810, September.
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    5. Mary Kay Gugerty, 2007. "You Can't Save Alone: Commitment in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Kenya," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55, pages 251-282.
    6. van den Brink, Rogier & Chavas, Jean-Paul, 1997. "The Microeconomics of an Indigenous African Institution: The Rotating Savings and Credit Association," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(4), pages 745-772, July.
    7. Mark M. Pitt & Shahidur R. Khandker, 1998. "The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 958-996, October.
    8. Abbi M Kedir & Richard Disney & Indraneel Dasgupta, 2011. "Why use ROSCAs when you can use banks? Theory, and evidence from Ethiopia," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/32, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jun 2011.
    9. Mohamed El Abdaimi, 1989. "Le financement informel. Problématique, typologie et évaluation à partir d'enquêtes à Marrakech et dans le Sud marocain," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 30(120), pages 869-879.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    RoSCA; Two-way ANOVA; Islamic finance; Default risk; Morocco.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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