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On the origins and main consequences of fiscal illusion. a short tribute to a big Economist: James Buchanan

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  • Vicini, Andrea

Abstract

This paper analyze the historical origin of Fiscal illusion, and introduce to the contribution of Public Choice and in particular James Buchanan which systematized all these concept in a coherent framework. Even the critiques and application of this Theory are mentioned.

Suggested Citation

  • Vicini, Andrea, 2011. "On the origins and main consequences of fiscal illusion. a short tribute to a big Economist: James Buchanan," MPRA Paper 60240, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2014.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:60240
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew T. Young, 2009. "Tax-Spend or Fiscal Illusion?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 29(3), pages 469-485, Fall.
    2. Richard E. Wagner, 2003. "Public Choice and the Diffusion of Classic Italian Public Finance," Il Pensiero Economico Italiano, Fabrizio Serra Editore, Pisa - Roma, vol. 11(1), pages 271-282.
    3. Dollery, Brian E & Worthington, Andrew C, 1996. "The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(3), pages 261-297, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Choice; James Buchanan; Fiscal Illusion.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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