Il federalismo fiscale e la questione della corretta distribuzione territoriale del gettito IVA
[The Implementation of Fiscal Federalism in Italy: the Appropriate Spatial Distribution of the VAT Revenue]
AbstractRecent attempts of "regionalizing" the VAT, in order to expand fiscal autonomy margins attributed to Regions and to involve them in the hard struggle against tax evasion, strongly urge some considerations on some of the changes introduced in the Italian legal system by the 2001 constitutional reform. Particularly, two issues deserve to be investigated, so far systematically neglected, if not absolutely ignored: the first concerning the regulation of revenue taxes sharing mechanism, the second, which is included in the first issue, regarding how choosing some even criteria of territorial distribution of tax revenue. In particular, this paper focuses on this second issue, joining the recent debate about the enforcement of the art. 119 of the Constitution (fiscal federalism) with a critical analysis of the "sales splitting up method", suggested in order to best realize VAT's decentralization and to make the local civil service aware of its responsibilities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30024.
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision: Jan 2008
Publication status: Published in Rivista economica del Mezzogiorno 1-2.a. XXI(2008): pp. 103-126
Value Added Tax; Tax Evasion; Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations; Differentials among Jurisdictions; Fiscal Federalism;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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