Payment Card Systems as an Example of two-sided Markets - a Challenge for Antitrust Authorities
AbstractThis article aims to present the concept of two-sided markets on the example of payment card systems, which have attracted the attention of regulatory and antitrust authorities in recent years. First, the paper offers a few insights into the basic economic theory behind two-sided markets. Second, it presents a brief description of payment card systems and their features. The following analysis focuses on arguments that speak in favour of a regulatory or antitrust intervention into payment card systems. Finally, some of the potential problems that antitrust authorities must face when assessing two-sided markets are presented on the basis of an assessment of the decisional practice of the UOKiK President and the European Commission.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 23822.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 2(2).2009(2009): pp. 125-140
two-sided markets; antitrust v. regulation; interchange fees; payment card systems;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
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IDEI Working Papers
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- Emch Eric & Thompson T. Scott, 2006. "Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-16, March.
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