Transfert de technologie sur une ville circulaire
AbstractThis paper compares three licensing regimes in a symmetric duopoly model situated on a circular city à la Salop. One of the firms holds a patent allowing to reduce the marginal production cost and decides to license its innovation under a fixed fee or a royalty regimes or not to license. The paper shows that fixed fee licensing is better than no licensing for a non drastic innovation which contradicts the result found by Poddar and Sinha (2004) in a linear model. Results also show that, for a non drastic innovation, fixed fee licensing is better than royalty licensing and the opposite for a drastic innovation. Finally, I show that optimal licensing regime for the patent holding firm when innovation is not drastic is fixed fee and I show that for this licensing regime a Nash equilibrium exists. When innovation is drastic, patent holding firm do not license and become a monopoly.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 22417.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Salop model; Technology transfer; Patent licensing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2010-05-08 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2010-05-08 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2010-05-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2010-05-08 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- de Frutos, M. A. & Hamoudi, H. & Jarque, X., 1999. "Equilibrium existence in the circle model with linear quadratic transport cost," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 605-615, September.
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