IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/116363.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Unification and Division: A Theory of Institutional Choices in Imperial China

Author

Listed:
  • Zhou, Haiwen

Abstract

Ancient China experienced various rounds of division and unification. Unification was maintained through economic and political institutions such as low tax rates to reduce peasant rebellions and the division of authority among government officials to reduce usurpation of power. A ruler’s choice of institutions to maintain unification is studied in a theoretical model. Interactions among external threats, internal rebellions by peasants, and usurpation of power by government officials are established. A higher level of external threats induces the ruler to choose a higher level of autonomy for government officials and a higher tax rate. That is, equilibrium probability of internal rebellions increases endogenously with the level of external threats. When government officials are more likely to usurp power, the ruler will choose a higher tax rate, thus equilibrium probability of peasant rebellions increases. Interestingly, a higher level of state power could induce the ruler to choose a lower tax rate!

Suggested Citation

  • Zhou, Haiwen, 2023. "Unification and Division: A Theory of Institutional Choices in Imperial China," MPRA Paper 116363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:116363
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/116363/1/MPRA_paper_116363.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haiwen Zhou, 2021. "Culture, institutions, and long‐run performance," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 372-391, August.
    2. Loren Brandt & Debin Ma & Thomas G. Rawski, 2014. "From Divergence to Convergence: Reevaluating the History behind China's Economic Boom," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(1), pages 45-123, March.
    3. Haiwen Zhou, 2012. "Internal Rebellions and External Threats: A Model of Government Organizational Forms in Ancient China," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(4), pages 1120-1141, April.
    4. Ma, Debin & Rubin, Jared, 2019. "The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 277-294.
    5. Qiang Chen, 2015. "Climate shocks, dynastic cycles and nomadic conquests: evidence from historical China," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 185-204.
    6. Chan, Kenneth S. & Laffargue, Jean-Pierre, 2016. "A Dynamic Model Of Taxation, Corruption, And Public Investment In The Dynastic Cycle: The Case Of Imperial China," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(8), pages 2123-2147, December.
    7. Haiwen Zhou, 2009. "Population Growth And Industrialization," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 249-265, April.
    8. Haiwen Zhou, 2012. "Internal Rebellions and External Threats: A Model of Government Organizational Forms in Ancient China," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(4), pages 1120-1141, April.
    9. Haiwen Zhou, 2011. "Confucianism and the Legalism: A model of the national strategy of governance in ancient China," Frontiers of Economics in China, Springer;Higher Education Press, vol. 6(4), pages 616-637, December.
    10. Chu, C Y Cyrus & Lee, Ronald D, 1994. "Famine, Revolt, and the Dynastic Cycle: Population Dynamics in Historic China," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 7(4), pages 351-378, November.
    11. Lei Wen & Haiwen Zhou, 2009. "Ability, Openness, and Managerial Decision Making," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 37(2), pages 197-208, June.
    12. Hicks, J. R., 1969. "A Theory of Economic History," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198811633.
    13. Haiwen Zhou, 2018. "A Model of Institutional Complementarities in Ancient China," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 286-304, April.
    14. Qiang Chen, 2015. "Climate Shocks, State Capacity and Peasant Uprisings in North China during 25–1911 ce," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82(326), pages 295-318, April.
    15. Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent & Wong, R. Bin, 2011. "Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in China and Europe," Economics Books, Harvard University Press, number 9780674057913, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Haiwen Zhou, 2023. "State Capacity and Leadership: Why Did China Take off?," Chinese Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 50-68, January.
    2. Haiwen Zhou, 2024. "National integration and institution building," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 26-43, February.
    3. Haiwen Zhou, 2018. "A Model of Institutional Complementarities in Ancient China," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 286-304, April.
    4. Haiwen Zhou, 2021. "Culture, institutions, and long‐run performance," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 372-391, August.
    5. Jiwei Qian & Tuan‐Hwee Sng, 2021. "The state in Chinese economic history," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(3), pages 359-395, November.
    6. Jared Rubin & Debin Ma, 2017. "The Paradox of Power: Understanding Fiscal Capacity in Imperial China and Absolutist Regimes," Working Papers 17-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    7. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Mark Koyama & Youhong Lin & Tuan-Hwee Sng, 2023. "The Fractured-Land Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 138(2), pages 1173-1231.
    8. Ma, Debin & Rubin, Jared, 2019. "The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 277-294.
    9. Yu Hao & Kevin Zhengcheng Liu, 2020. "Taxation, fiscal capacity, and credible commitment in eighteenth‐century China: the effects of the formalization and centralization of informal surtaxes," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 73(4), pages 914-939, November.
    10. Haiwen Zhou, 2011. "Confucianism and the Legalism: A Model of the National Strategy of Governance in Ancient China," Frontiers of Economics in China-Selected Publications from Chinese Universities, Higher Education Press, vol. 6(4), pages 616-637, December.
    11. Thomas Barbiero & Haiwen Zhou, 2024. "Culture and Economic Development in Late Comers: Comparing China and India," Working Papers 086, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
    12. Haiwen Zhou, 2012. "Internal Rebellions and External Threats: A Model of Government Organizational Forms in Ancient China," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(4), pages 1120-1141, April.
    13. Haiwen Zhou & Ruhai Zhou, 2023. "Shirking and capital accumulation under oligopolistic competition," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 51(2), pages 394-407, September.
    14. Chiu Yu Ko & Mark Koyama & Tuan†Hwee Sng, 2018. "Unified China And Divided Europe," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(1), pages 285-327, February.
    15. Moriguchi, Chiaki & Sng, Tuan-Hwee, 2022. "The Size of Polities in Historical Political Economy," CEI Working Paper Series 2022-02, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    16. Philip T. Hoffman, 2020. "The Great Divergence: Why Britain Industrialised First," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(2), pages 126-147, July.
    17. Angyridis, Constantine & Zhou, Haiwen, 2022. "Search, Technology Choice, and Unemployment," MPRA Paper 112064, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Roland, Gérard & Jia, Ruixue & Xie, Yang, 2021. "A Theory of Power Structure and Institutional Compatibility: China vs. Europe Revisited," CEPR Discussion Papers 15700, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Shuo Chen & Debin Ma, 2022. "States and wars: China’s long march towards unity and its consequences, 221 BC – 1911 AD," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _199, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    20. Kevin Sylwester, 2019. "Imperial Synchronicity in Eurasia: 300 BCE To 1500 CE," Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, Eurasian Publications, vol. 7(2), pages 59-73.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Chinese history; institutional design; size of nations; political economy; division of power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:116363. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.