The financial leverage of Insurers subject to price regulation: evidence from Canada
AbstractThe variation in the degree of price regulation in the property-liability insurance market in Canada varies across time and space, creating an opportunity to test a recurring theory in regulatory economics: that price regulated firms have higher levels of financial leverage. Using an instrumental variable for the stringency of price-regulation, this paper utilizes a panel data set of Canadian property-liability insurers over ten years of time, 1997-2006. The results support the theory but do not conclude on whether the increase in financial leverage is a strategic decision or a natural reaction to worsening business conditions brought-on by price-regulation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 10845.
Date of creation: 30 Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Price Regulation; Insurance; Financial Leverage; Capital Structure; Bankruptcy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2008-10-07 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-IAS-2008-10-07 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-REG-2008-10-07 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert A. Taggart, Jr., 1982. "Effects of Regulation on Utility Financing: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 0866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Taggart, Robert A, Jr, 1981. "Rate-of-Return Regulation and Utility Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 383-93, May.
- Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
- Taggart, Robert A, Jr, 1985. "Effects of Regulation on Utility Financing: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 257-76, March.
- Robert Klein & Richard Phillips & Wenyan Shiu, 2002. "The Capital Structure of Firms Subject to Price Regulation: Evidence from the Insurance Industry," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 79-100, February.
- Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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